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Incentive Structures for Professors in Germany and
the United States: Implications for Cross-National
Borrowing in Higher Education Reform
EGON FRANCK AND CHRISTIAN OPITZ
In many countries throughout the world, politicians, scientists, and other
citizens debate the effectiveness and international competitiveness of their
respective higher education systems. In this debate, higher education in the
United States plays a prominent role, at least in part because of its outstanding
results in areas such as research output. Thus, in their initiatives to reform
their own systems of higher education government, officials and educators
in a variety of countries have sought to borrow or copy one or more of the
institutional elements that they believe account for the superior performance
of the U.S. system. The practice of importing selected parts of the U.S. system
of higher education into other national systems is widespread, making these
transfers a phenomenon of global relevance and importance.1
German higher education is not an exception. In order to “introduce
incentives for greater efficiency and improved quality” in 2002, the German
federal government amended its Higher Education Act.2 Crucial elements
of this reform, implemented throughout the entire public sector of the
German higher education system in 2004, are the introduction of explicit
performance-related rewards as part of the official salary scheme of professors
and the introduction of formal programs in doctoral education. Both in-
novations were represented as closely mirroring the institutional practices of
renowned U.S. universities. Performance-related rewards are explicitly in-
tended to augment the efficiency of professors’ work by strengthening in-
centives to produce high-quality research and teaching. The development of
formal doctoral programs, which replace the current apprenticeship model
We would like to thank three anonymous referees for their critiques and various comments. The
support of the coeditors, Mark Ginsburg and David Post, who have provided very valuable assistance
during the review process, is gratefully acknowledged. Their continuous effort has significantly improved
the article.
1 Developed and developing nations are equally concerned. These nations include Japan, France,
Spain, the United Kingdom, South Africa, as well as a number of former Soviet republics and Arab
countries. Compare Yoshikazu Ogawa, “Challenging the Traditional Organization of Japanese Univer-
sities,” Higher Education 43 (Spring 2002): 85–108; Martin Finkelstein, “Japan’s National Universities and
Reform,” International Higher Education 33 (Fall 2003): 7–9; Heather Eggins, ed., Globalization and Reform
in Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003); and James Coffman, “Higher Education in the Gulf:
Privatization and Americanization,” International Higher Education 33 (Fall 2003): 17–19.
2 Hans R. Friedrich, “Academic Staff and Staff Structure Reforms in Germany,” in Employment and Working
Conditions of Academic Staff in Europe, ed. Ju¨rgen Enders (Darmstadt: Spitzer Druck, 2000), 3–14, 3.
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of doctoral education, is designed to (a) reduce the power of individual
professors, thus enhancing the freedom of young researchers, and (b) in-
crease the overall quality of doctoral education, thus attracting the most
motivated and gifted individuals.
However, there are reasons to doubt that these measures will enhance
the competitiveness of German higher education. First, institutional elements
are embedded in a broader institutional context. Thus, elements imported
from different contexts may well produce fundamentally different results.3
Second, replacing or changing certain institutional elements may alter the
functioning of other elements. Consequently, the transfer of single elements
between different higher education systems may not have the intended effect.
In this article we examine these issues, building upon previous efforts to
apply economic theory to academic behavior in specific institutional settings
and demonstrating how economic reasoning about incentive structures can
also contribute to cross-national comparisons of academic behavior.4
Governing Higher Education
The U.S. and German higher education systems are organized around
two fundamentally different models, the market model and the bureaucratic
model, respectively. These models differ with respect to the degree of reg-
ulation by the state, the extent of competition among institutions, and the
nature of institutional differentiation within the system.
3 See Harold Noah, “The Uses and Abuses of Comparative Education,” in New Approaches to Com-
parative Education, ed. Philip G. Altbach and Gail P. Kelly (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982),
153–65.
4 There is a large body of economic literature that focuses on specific institutional elements in
U.S. higher education, including work from many authors who have studied incentives for professors
and the institution of academic tenure. See H. Lorne Carmichael, “Incentives in Academics: Why Is
There Tenure?” Journal of Political Economy 96 ( June 1988): 453–72; Aloisius Siow, “Tenure and Other
Unusual Personnel Practices in Academia,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 14 (April 1998):
153–73; Richard B. McKenzie, “In Defense of Academic Tenure,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics 152 (October 1996): 325–41; Richard Chait, “Coming Soon: Alternatives to Tenure,” Planning
for Higher Education 25 (December 1997): 67–71; Philo Hutcheson, “Tenure: Traditions, Policies, and
Practices,” Review of Higher Education 21 (September 1998): 303–13; and Michael S. McPherson and
Morton O. Shapiro, “Tenure Issues in Higher Education,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 13 (Winter
1999): 85–98. Related research examines university governance and competition between schools. See
Robert E. McCormick and Roger E. Meiners, “University Governance: A Property Rights Perspective,”
Journal of Law and Economics 31 (October 1988): 423–42; Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White,
“The University in the Marketplace: Some Insights and Some Puzzles,” in Studies of Supply and Demand
in Higher Education, ed. Charles T. Clotfelter and Michael Rothschild (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1993), 11–37; and Gordon C. Winston, “Subsidies, Hierarchy and Peers: The Awkward Economics
of Higher Education,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 13 (Winter 1999): 13–36. In Germany, research
devoted to academic incentives from an economic perspective is a quite recent phenomenon. See Yvette
E. Hofmann, “Motiv- und Anreizstrukturen wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter der Betriebswirtschaftslehre:
Ansatzpunkte fu¨r die Gestaltung eines Anreizsystems auf Basis einer empirischen Analyse,” Beitra¨ge zur
Hochschulforschung 4 (September 1998): 333–52; Friedrich Buttler, “Anreizkompatibilita¨t in Hochschulor-
ganisation und Hochschulrecht,” Schriften des Vereins fu¨r Socialpolitik 262 ( June 1998): 233–52; Alfred
Kieser, “U¨ber Marktmechanismen nachdenken: Aspekte zum Wettbewerb an Universita¨ten,” Forschung
und Lehre 6 (October 1999): 284–85.
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The Market Model in the United States
U.S. higher education closely follows what can be termed a “market
model.”5 This model is characterized by a low degree of state regulation and
a high degree of competition among institutions. Within the higher edu-
cation system, institutions are relatively autonomous with respect to their
decisions about modifying their curricula, selecting their student bodies and
their faculty members, and generating revenue through tuition and other
services charged to students, through grants-contracts made by public-private
sector organizations, and through donations obtained through fund-raising
efforts. The amounts charged for tuition and fees, as well as the salaries paid
to academic personnel, are market prices, in the sense that they are—if at
all—only modestly restricted by state regulation.
The coexistence of state-owned (i.e., public) and private institutions in
U.S. higher education does not alter its basic, market-driven model. Public
institutions have adapted large sections of their governance structure from
their private competitors and face a similar, relatively low degree of state
regulation. Public institutions may use their financial resources to cover their
current costs or invest them to accumulate wealth (i.e., endowments). More-
over, public institutions are not fully dependent on subsidies granted to them
by the state but actively raise funds. These nonstate resources generally make
up a significant fraction of total income.6
Theoretically, at least, in a system in which institutions of higher education
are highly autonomous and compete for resources in a “market” for edu-
cational services, there is a direct connection between performance and
rewards. Institutions that deliver high quality in research and teaching im-
prove their reputation. This spurs the demand for their services and ulti-
mately augments their disposable income.7 The functioning of this mecha-
nism can be illustrated by looking, for example, at the “quality of student
output.”8
5 Compare Gary Rhoades, “Market Models, Managerial Institutions, and Managed Professionals,”
International Higher Education 13 (Fall 1998): 3–4.
6 This fraction varies with the type of institution. In 1998, public 4-year institutions received 52.7
percent of the total income from nonstate sources. For German public universities this fraction is less
than 5 percent. See Frans Kaiser, Hans Vossensteyn, and Joes Koelman, Public Funding of Higher Education:
A Comparative Study of Funding Mechanisms in Ten Countries (Enschede: CHEPS, 2002), 69, 96.
7 Winston, “Subsidies, Hierarchy and Peers,” 22. This statement refers to an ideal case assumed by
the theory. In the real-world scenario, other factors, e.g., the residue of historical status, social networks,
and politics, also play an important role. We are indebted to one of the coeditors for making this point.
8 We put the expression “quality of student output” in quotation marks and are aware that it needs
further definition. Quality in higher education is a very complex and multifaceted matter. Quality of
student output may refer to graduates’ intellectual-academic abilities, knowledge and skill, or social
capital (in the sense of Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” in Handbook of Theory and Research in
the Sociology of Education, ed. John G. Richardson [New York: Greenwood, 1985], 241–58). In the ideal-
type market model of higher education, however, “market forces” automatically determine the value of
all aspects of quality. Institutions in turn may specialize and deliberately influence different aspects of
quality and will be rewarded accordingly. For a further economic analysis of this issue, see Michael S.
McPherson and Gordon C. Winston, “The Economics of Cost, Price, and Quality in U.S. Higher Ed-
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Institutions producing high-quality graduates are compensated in many
ways. In general, their graduates will earn higher incomes and be more
influential in various sectors of society. As alumni they can make higher
financial contributions and offer more valuable direct support. As business
executives, professionals, and government officials they are more able to
successfully direct financial and other resources to their alma mater. More-
over, alumni success draws the attention of other potential donors, since it
proves that the institution “makes something” out of donated resources.9
Finally, alumni success captures the attention of firms, which may raise the
demand for research, training, and technical assistance offered by the university
and at the same time enhance the job prospects of current graduates. Higher
starting salaries for graduates, in turn, allow for higher tuition fees. In the
market model, quality, reputation, and income thus tend to be highly corre-
lated. As Robert Frank and Phillip Cook put it, “The evidence suggests that
the perceived quality of a university is closely related to the achievement levels
of its faculty, students and alumni. This means that any initial improvement
in quality, whatever its source, will make it easier to attract top students and
faculty, which in turn will yield still further improvements in reputation.”10
Feedback mechanisms of this kind have led to a differentiated and rather
stable hierarchy of institutions in U.S. higher education, which Gordon Winston
refers to as a “hierarchical education market.”11 Hierarchical stratification is
supplemented by segmentation. Institutions have incentives to concentrate
their activities on certain segments of the education market in order to out-
perform other institutions by targeting their services to the needs of a particular
subset of potential customers, employers, grant makers, and so on. Students
select those institutions whose orientation and educational level best suit their
abilities and further plans; employers in turn hire graduates from those schools
that best meet their human capital demand. And in every segment the top
places are limited by definition. These ranks are held by elite institutions like
Harvard, Stanford, or the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
ucation,” in Paying the Piper: Productivity, Incentives, and Financing in U.S. Higher Education, ed. Michael
S. McPherson, Morton Owen Shapiro, and Gordon C. Winston (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1993), 69–108.
9 Compare Burton A. Weisbrod and Nestor D. Dominguez, “Demand for Collective Goods in Private
Non-profit Markets,” Journal of Public Economics 30 ( June 1986): 83–95.
10 Robert H. Frank and Phillip J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society (New York: Free Press, 1995),
36.
11 Winston, “Subsidies, Hierarchy and Peers,” 19. Dennis Epple and Richard Romano (“Competition
between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects,” American Economic Review 88
[Spring 1998]: 33–62) present a theoretical model on how competition promotes quality differentiation.
An empirical investigation of these effects is available in Dennis Epple, David Figlio, and Richard
Romano, “Competition between Private and Public Schools: Testing Stratification and Pricing Predic-
tions,” Journal of Public Economics 88 ( July 2004): 1215–46.
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The Bureaucratic Model in Germany
In contrast to the U.S. case, the organization of German higher education
closely follows what can be termed the “bureaucratic model.”12 This model
is characterized by a high degree of state regulation and, in its extreme form,
the complete absence of competition among institutions. Market coordina-
tion is replaced by administrative governance. Universities are subject to rigid
state regulation. For example, state authorities regulate the allocation of
students and academics to schools by defining application criteria and se-
lection procedures. Unlike the case within the market model—where insti-
tutions of higher education have strong incentives to control their “student
input,” since the quality of their educational output crucially depends on this
important “ingredient”—public universities (universita¨ten) in Germany until
recently had to enroll all applicants with an abitur (the German high school
diploma) allocated to them by a centralized state agency.13
Moreover, state agencies perform the resource allocation between—and
to a large extent even within—institutions. Higher education institutions have
only limited financial autonomy, meaning that they are highly dependent on
the state for revenue. Any tuition charged to students is set by the state (rather
than through a market mechanism). Under this system, the state tends to
prescribe how the funds are to be spent, leaving little space for discretion at
the institutional or subinstitutional level.14
Private institutions of higher education in Germany are much less re-
stricted by state regulation and act in an institutional setting that in many
respects is comparable to that in the United States. The fundamentally bu-
reaucratic nature of Germany’s higher education system, however, is not
altered by the existence of these private institutions, since they are generally
small and offer programs in only a single field, mostly business studies. More-
12 For a comprehensive description of the German higher education system, see Jerome Huisman,
Higher Education in Germany (Enschede: CHEPS, 2003).
13 Winston speaks of a “customer-based production technology” (“Subsidies, Hierarchy and Peers,”
17) to stress the role of student input in higher education. For a formal discussion of this issue, see
Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White, “The Analytics of the Pricing of Higher Education and
Other Services in Which the Customers Are Inputs,” Journal of Political Economy 103 ( June 1995): 573–86.
The centralized state agency referred to in the text distributed applicants along several criteria, including
abitur grades and proximity to home. Nowadays, German universities are allowed to control their student
input more independently by defining specific selection criteria, conducting assessment centers, and
accepting only those applicants who match best their student demand.
14 However, there are some signs of departure from the underlying ideology of uniformity in recent
years. State governments have embarked on a process of granting more discretion to institutions of
higher education, e.g., concerning the internal allocation of their funds and the design of new curricula.
But still, there is only a very weak connection between budgets and the quality of an institution’s services.
For details on the current allocation procedure of state funds, see Huisman, Higher Education in Germany,
31ff. Some la¨nder have recently started to allocate fractions of their funds according to indicators, such
as the number of graduates, doctoral degrees awarded, and the volume of additional research income
(Drittmittel) generated. See Michael Leszcensky, “Zukunftsweisendes Modell? Indikatorgesteuerte Mit-
telverteilung in elf Bundesla¨ndern,” Forschung und Lehre 11 (September 2004): 493–95.
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over, the fraction of students that is served by these schools is tiny.15 Thus,
higher education in Germany is clearly dominated by public institutions,
which are subject to the described restrictions associated with the bureaucratic
model.
Under the bureaucratic model there is only limited possibility—or ne-
cessity—for institutions to specialize or to build up a reputational status that
is based on the quality of their services. Scientific orientation, reputation, as
well as the financial well-being and sustainability of an institution are deter-
mined by the state and not—as in the market model—closely tied to the
valuation of an institution’s educational services. Consequently, in the bu-
reaucratic model, quality differences among institutions or types of institu-
tions are predefined by the state as well. The structure of bureaucratic higher
education systems, therefore, may be uniform unless the state deliberately
differentiates quality among institutions. An elite strata of institutions is pos-
sible only if the state disproportionately allocates financial and other resources
to such institutions and if this is accompanied by a redirection of superior
student and academic talent to these places.16
The educational policies of German authorities after World War II have
not been favorable to the emergence of an elite segment in higher education.
Instead, a higher education system with only two quality levels, universita¨ten
and fachhochschulen, has been implemented. Fachhochschulen, which in the
winter term of 2004 enrolled about 40 percent of higher education students,
offer shorter and more practical programs and do not as of yet provide
doctoral-level education.17 Within each of those two segments, state regulation
aims at securing a homogeneous or egalitarian structure. While it is true that
certain institutions are somewhat more recognized than others, at least for
specific subjects, the interinstitutional competition and hierarchy are not as
explicit as in the United States: in the words of Ju¨rgen Enders and Ulrich
Teichler, “German universities are assumed to be fairly homogeneous, as far
as the quality of teaching and research is concerned.”18
15 In 2004, Germany’s higher education system consisted of 128 public fachhochschulen, 88 public
universita¨ten, and 60 private institutions. The latter accounted for less than 2 percent of total student
population. See German Federal Statistical Office, Personal an Hochschulen 2004-Fachserie 11/4.4 (Wies-
baden: Bundesdruckerei, 2005), table 7.
16 A prominent example of a predefined elite segment in a bureaucratic higher education system
is the grandes e´coles in France. Apart from a few exceptions, these institutions are state financed and
state controlled. See Michalina Vaughan, “The Grandes E´coles: Selection, Legitimation, Perpetuation,”
in Elites in France, ed. Jolyon Howorth and Phil G. Cerny (London: Pinter, 1981), 93–103.
17 See German Federal Statistical Office, http://www.statistik_portal.de/Statistik_Portal/de_jb04
_jahrtab50.asp.
18 See Ju¨rgen Enders and Ulrich Teichler, “The Academic Profession in Germany,” in The Inter-
national Academic Profession: Portraits of Fourteen Countries, ed. Philip G. Altbach (San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass, 1996), 439–92, 439. Homogeneity between German universita¨ten and fachhochschulen, though, is
not perfect. Rankings that annually appear in magazines, e.g., Der Spiegel (being roughly analogous to
the rankings of U.S. institutions that appear in U.S. News and World Report), suggest existing quality
differences and list schools by discipline and school type. In the ideal model of a bureaucratic higher
education system, quality differences in between predefined quality layers are ruled out, and one has
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This rather egalitarian setup seems to be well understood—inside and
outside the business world. In a recent survey among 250 of Germany’s largest
employers, the importance of the university one graduated from ranked only
ninth out of 10 categories influencing the employment decision. More im-
portant to employers were internships with a company, language skills, final
grades, stays in a foreign country, and length of study.19 On an Internet site
that is directed at foreign students intending to study in Germany, the DAAD
(Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst), a state-funded institution organizing
international student and faculty exchange, states, “Universities are consid-
ered to be equal in rank. Important status differences such as can be found
in Anglo-Saxon countries do not exist in Germany.”20 Finally, German pro-
fessors rank the importance of their affiliation to the institutions in which
they are employed much lower than do their colleagues in the United States.21
Basic Elements of the Incentive Structures for Professors
In this section we examine the basic elements of the incentive structures
that have historically existed for academics in the United States and Germany.
At the same time we will discuss how the incentive structure that has operated
in the United States is embedded in a market model of differentiated hier-
archical higher education institutions. By contrast, the German incentive
structure is aligned with the bureaucratic model of higher education—which
is without a predefined segment of elite and nonelite education—that has
characterized the German system.
Competitive Market for Professorial Talent in the United States
In the market model of U.S. higher education, competition between
institutions directly translates into competition for professorial talent.22 Since
their reputation and income depends on the quality of their services, uni-
versities and their departments have incentives not only to seek to control
their student input but also to enhance the quality of their faculty.
to ask how these differences in Germany have evolved, despite a heavy degree of state regulation and
state monitoring. An important factor may be the age of an institution. “Tradition” favors older insti-
tutions, which typically offer a broad array of disciplines and serve large numbers of students. Attractive
student-faculty ratings and lower costs of living favor smaller institutions, which tend to be situated in
less urbanized areas. Finally, a number of private schools that—unlike public institutions—have always
been allowed to control their student input are regularly ranked in top places.
19 See Jochen Leffers, “Die Favoriten der Personalchefs,” Der Spiegel, no. 6 (2003), 12–18.
20 See http://www.daad.de/deutschland/de/2.1.4.html.
21 In a survey that was conducted in 1990, 31 percent of German professors (compared with 3
percent in the United States) ranked the importance of their affiliation to a particular institution “not
at all important.” Less distinct prestige differences between institutions are a plausible explanation for
this result. See Ernest L. Boyer, Philip G. Altbach, and Mary Jean Whitelaw, The Academic Profession: An
International Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1994),
80.
22 See Larry L. Leslie and Sheila A. Slaughter, “The Development and Current Status of Market
Mechanisms in United States Postsecondary Education,” Higher Education Policy 10, nos. 3–4 (1997):
239–52.
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Salary packages reflect individual as well as institutional reputation.—Salaries
for professors in the United States routinely include variable components
and bonuses, which are tied to a wide spectrum of quality indicators and are
explicitly designed to reward outstanding achievements. In the market model,
universities are free to define these indicators according to their respective
profile and mission. They may reward excellence in research and teaching
as well as previous experience, contacts, or consulting with business firms or
government agencies, all of which have an impact on the institution’s rec-
ognition outside academia. In addition, professors have opportunities outside
the university to augment their official incomes. Many professors regularly
engage in research, consulting, and education for outside-of-university clients.
The levels of compensation professors receive not only reflect their individual
reputations but also the success of their departments, school or college, or
university. The more renowned the institution (or the unit within an insti-
tution) is, the more attractive the overall compensation package offered to
individual academics will be. In the United States, there is a strong correlation
between the reputation of individual professors and the corporate reputations
of their institutions or subinstitution units.23 More-renowned universities have
higher endowments and are able to offer more attractive packages in terms
of salaries, teaching loads, and working conditions. Therefore, in the United
States the most talented professors will be systematically attracted to the most
renowned institutions in their field. For example, other things being equal
(such as climate and cultural attractions of the setting), the most talented
researchers should prefer the most successful research universities, which are
able to make the most attractive offers in this segment of the market.24 As a
result, there is likely to be a comparatively higher degree of homogeneity
23 See Winston, “Subsidies, Hierarchy and Peers,” 30.
24 Positive correlations among faculty earnings, individual prestige (measured by publications and
citations), and institutional prestige are documented; see Daniel S. Hamermesh, George E. Johnson,
and Burton A. Weisbrod, “Scholarship, Citations and Salaries: Economic Rewards in Economics,” Southern
Economic Journal 49 (October 1982): 472–81; David Ault, Gilbert Rutman, and Thomas Stevenson, “Some
Factors Affecting Mobility in the Labor Market for Academic Economists,” Economic Inquiry 20 ( January
1982): 104–32. Besides individual performance and institutional prestige, a number of other factors
have an influence on faculty salaries in the United States. See James C. Hearn, “Pay and Performance
in the University: An Examination of Faculty Salaries,” Review of Higher Education 22 (Summer 1999):
391–410; and W. Lee Hansen, “Merit Pay in Higher Education,” in Academic Labor Markets and Careers,
ed. D. W. Breneman and T. I. K. Youn (Philadelphia: Falmer, 1988), 114–37. Notably, there are significant
salary differences between disciplines and fields. At one institution, the average salaries of full professors
in high-paying fields (e.g., business management and economics, computer science, engineering, and
law) on average may equal 150 percent of full professors’ salaries in low-paying fields (e.g., foreign
language and literature or visual and performing arts). See American Association of University Professors,
“Don’t Blame Faculty for High Tuition,” Academe 90 (March–April 2004): 21–46, 26. Hearn (394) reports
that these differences have been growing in recent years. Obviously faculty salaries reflect salary dif-
ferences that characterize the nonacademic labor market. For the employment and retention of pro-
fessors in prospering fields, higher salaries may be needed.
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among U.S. faculty members, with respect to orientation and specialization,
in given departments, schools or colleges, and universities.25
However, the fact that individual remuneration packages tend to reflect
the success of the institution does not mean that all professors receive an
equal share of the pie. From a theoretical point of view, several specific
features of the production process in higher education have to be taken into
account: (a) time lags and temporal wage shifts, (b) team production and
tournaments, and (c) corrective measures to motivate senior staff.
Time lags and temporal wage shifts.—What professors officially do usually
takes a long time to be transformed into measurable outcome, for example,
when research produces results recognized by scientific colleagues and the
broader community. It takes even longer for high-quality teaching to lead to
the exceptional performance of graduates in their professional careers.
Because the production processes in higher education are characterized
by substantial time lags between production and reaping rewards, it is not
sufficient to link professors’ salaries to the current success of their institution.
Because of the prevalent time lags and the problem that certain outputs
cannot be accurately measured at the present time, a shift of wage proportions
over longer periods of time is needed. The compensation practice of pro-
fessors in the United States is in line with this temporal shift of wage pro-
portions. Thus, salaries of U.S. professors rise steeply over the different hi-
erarchical levels. In a given institution or strata of institutions, the salaries of
assistant professors are significantly lower than those of full professors, even
though the average assistant professor’s salary varies across institutions.26
Team production and tournaments.—However, not only is there a time lag
between input and output, but the output is also a team product in the sense
25 Competition for professorial talent in the market model results in outside offers and the con-
tinuous movement of (at least some) faculty between institutions. Institutions that have “lost” a professor
to a competing school will try to fill this gap with a candidate who best matches the requirements that
accord with their prestige and specialization. In the long run, and under the conditions of an ideal
market, the distribution of academics to institutions closely mirrors the underlying hierarchy and seg-
mentation of institutions. Under real-world conditions, of course, neither the market for professorial
talent nor the market for institutional prestige works without frictions. Faculty heterogeneity may stem,
among other factors, from mobility costs (specific investments in private property, family ties, or social
contacts) and incomplete information. The attitudes, work activities, and research productivity of in-
dividual professors are not only diverse but also underlie intrapersonal variations over time. The future
development at the point of faculty entry may or may not be correctly anticipated. Moreover, professors
may redirect their interests because individual preferences and tastes have changed over time.
26 See McPherson and Shapiro, “Tenure Issues in Higher Education.” There are other explanations
for the higher salaries of senior professors. For example, it may take years to establish personal ties to
those individuals who determine compensation, and thus senior faculty are more likely to benefit from
such. Systematic differences in productivity may account for this observation as well, though this ex-
planation is not supported by empirical evidence. The productivity of professors, at least as measured
by the quantity and quality of their publications, tends to decline with age. See Arthur Diamond, “The
Life Cycle Research Productivity of Mathematicians and Scientists,” Journal of Gerontology 41 ( July 1986):
520–25; Sharon G. Levin and Paula E. Stephan, “Research Productivity over the Life Cycle: Evidence
for Academic Scientists,” American Economic Review 81 (Spring 1991): 114–32.
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described by Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz.27 And it is the team prod-
uct that contributes to the reputation and the resources of the department,
school or college, or university, regardless of whether each faculty member
contributes equally to the product. Without additional institutional safe-
guards, the well-known free-rider problem arises because some professors
may reduce their present effort and still benefit from outcomes generated
by their more productive colleagues.
Tournaments and “up-or-out-rules” can be interpreted as institutional
safeguards against free riders.28 At U.S. universities, the position of a full
professor is reached in several stages through a series of tournaments, in
which relative performance is measured. At each stage only the “winners”
are promoted, whereas the “losers” have to leave the institution or remain
at a status below that of the full professor. This procedure ensures that juniors
must keep their level of effort high, if they want to enjoy bonuses as a senior.
The problem of motivating senior professors and corrective measures.—At first
sight the combination of temporal wage shifts and tournaments resembles
the practice of “deferred compensation” that can be observed in many other
industries. In law firms and management consultancies, for example, younger
employees are systematically remunerated below their productivity, whereas
senior employees receive more than their current actual output contribution.
In this context, tournaments and up-or-out-rules are generally interpreted as
mechanisms to reduce free-rider effects, on the one hand, and to select future
seniors, on the other.29 When they become partners, these seniors participate
in the present success of their firms.
From this perspective, partners can be compared with senior professors
in academic organizations, who also receive salary premiums according to
the current success of their institution. However, there is a substantial dif-
ference: partners in law firms and consultancies contribute to the present
success of their firms with their day-to-day work. Under these conditions lower-
level workers work hard as long as they are in the tournament in order to
become a partner and receive the deferred parts of their salary. Because their
daily work contributes to the present success of the firm and therefore to
the “pie” they are allowed to share with their peers, partners also have some
incentives to exert effort in this setting.
In the university context, the time lag between actual performance and
27 Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs and Economic Orga-
nization,” American Economic Review 62 (May 1972): 777–95.
28 For discussions of these mechanisms in the United States, see Sherwin Rosen, “Prizes and In-
centives in Elimination Tournaments,” American Economic Review 76 (April 1986): 701–15; and Michael
Waldman, “Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective,” Journal of Labor Economics 8 (March 1990):
230–50.
29 See George A. Akerlof and Lawrence F. Katz, “Workers Trust Funds and the Logic of Wage
Profiles,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (August 1989): 525–36; Edward P. Lazear, “Agency, Earnings
Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions,” American Economic Review 71 (April 1981): 606–20.
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outcome leads to a distortion of this incentive mechanism. There is no im-
mediate correlation between the current work of senior professors and actual
rewards. Professors approaching the end of their service lack extrinsic in-
centives to continue working hard. Since their current level of effort leads
to an outcome in the distant future, they most likely will not enjoy the cor-
responding rewards anymore. In higher education, deferred compensation
and tournaments, in other words, may systematically produce a motivation
problem for senior professors.
A number of corrective measures can be employed to deal with this
problem. First, the biased influence of senior professors on the tournament
generating the new generation of professors can be restricted. Formal PhD
programs at the faculty level assign the monitoring of these processes away
from the individual professor and limit the use of graduate students for the
pursuit of personal and short-term interests. Second, the activities of senior
professors can be shifted into fields that are more easily monitored. In un-
dergraduate teaching and administrative work, for example, a reduced effort
is fairly observable. Finally, attempts to evaluate the work of senior professors
also can be made. So-called posttenure reviews seek to monitor the current
effort of professors and to produce additional information for decisions about
compensation levels or even continued employment.30
Incentives for Academics in Germany
The incentive structure for academics in Germany differs from that ex-
perienced by faculty members in the United States. For instance, in line with
the bureaucratic model of organization, the professoriate in Germany is com-
pensated in a uniform manner.
Uniform compensation according to official terms.—In the bureaucratic higher
education model, rigid state regulation extends to the employment condi-
tions and labor market for academics. Professors typically are civil servants
and get paid uniformly according to official terms. Salary levels may vary with
the predefined hierarchy of institutions and in addition include an age pro-
gression. Professors compete for promotion to higher positions and thus
salary levels. Promotion procedures are laid down by the state as well.31
In Germany, professors are appointed by the ministry of science in their
respective states (la¨nder) and are remunerated according to national law. A
professorship constitutes a lifetime employment. Although professors at fach-
hochschulen receive lower salaries than professors at universita¨ten, competition
30 See Richard Edwards, “Can Post-tenure Review Help Us Save the Tenure System?” Academe 83
(May 1997): 26–31; Patricia A. Hollander, “Evaluating Tenured Professors,” Chronicle of Higher Education,
no. 19 ( June 1992), A44; Madeleine J. Goodman, “The Review of Tenured Faculty at a Research
University: Outcomes and Appraisals,” Review of Higher Education 18 ( January 1994): 83–94.
31 Similarly, in France, the distribution of posts is managed by the central administration in a
nationwide concours. See Thierry Chevaillier, “French Academics: Between the Profession and the Civil
Service,” Higher Education 41, nos. 1–2 (2001): 49–75.
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for promotion to the universita¨ten level has until recently been hindered by
the habilitation, a second doctorate that was a prerequisite for teaching at
universita¨ten. Instead of obtaining the habilitation, professors at fachhochschulen
were required to have at least 3 years of practical experience in their field
of appointment. This means that professors at fachhochschulen would have to
come back as assistants to the universita¨t and receive their habilitation before
they could apply for a job as professor at the universita¨t. Since they had a
systematic disadvantage, compared with candidates staying in science and
working for the habilitation immediately after completing their first doctorate,
such cases hardly ever took place.
If there were no other mechanisms spurring competition, German higher
education would face a substantial incentive problem for professors. If we
extract the phenomenon of intrinsic motivation, there would literally be no
incentives at all to fulfill more than the contractually fixed teaching load
after initial appointment. However, this is not the case since there are ad-
ditional labor-market mechanisms, which allow individual professors to cap-
italize on their individual reputations.32 Outstanding professors can signifi-
cantly upgrade their incomes as well as the resources at their disposal through
mobility within the academic labor market, on the one hand, and by pursuing
part-time earning opportunities outside the university, on the other.
Individual incentives through the academic labor market and earning opportunities
outside the university.—In Germany, appointed professors until recently could
not be promoted to a higher salary level unless they received a job offer from
another university. Once selected from the pool of applicants, they were
allowed to negotiate for a salary increase with the respective state ministry.
Permanent bonuses of up to 60 percent of the basic salary could be fixed in
a series of such bargaining processes. In addition, professors could negotiate
over working conditions—in particular research budgets, the number of as-
sistantships, and the amount of time that could be devoted to extrauniversity
work.33
Furthermore, success on the job market for professors allowed them to
choose their location. This choice is relevant beyond attractive leisure op-
portunities, since different locations have different opportunities for earning
money outside the university. German professors thus capitalized on their
individual reputations in working out new contracts with the state as well as
with customers who paid for their services privately. Of course, reputation
can also be satisfactory in itself, without being traded on secondary markets.
32 As described before, professors in the United States also have incentives to manage their indi-
vidual reputations. At this point we intend to stress that German professors still have reputations despite
an otherwise egalitarian and regulated environment.
33 For details on this appointment procedure, see Uwe Schimank, “Unsolved Problems and In-
adequate Solutions: The Situation of Academic Staff in German Higher Education,” in Academic Staff
in Europe: Changing Contexts and Conditions, ed. Ju¨rgen Enders (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2001): 115–36,
117ff.
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Since it was the state ministry that paid professors’ salaries, and not their
institutions, any institution could seek to attract outstanding professors. Pro-
fessors, in turn, could apply for positions at any institution. As a result of this
allocation procedure, the distribution of professorial talent between univer-
sities was more uniform compared with the distribution in the United States.
Without a necessary connection between educational quality and resource
allocation, institutions found it difficult to build reputations. Thus, institu-
tional reputation has not influenced the distribution of professorial talent in
Germany in the way in which it tends to do in the United States.34
Institutionalized access to the additional labor power of assistants.—The rela-
tionship between professors and their assistants in the chair-based organi-
zation of German universita¨ten plays an important role within the regime of
individual reputation management.35 The large majority of doctoral students
work as staff members with temporary contracts and are assigned to university
chairs.36 This makes these assistants extremely dependent on and subordinate
to professors, who not only decide about contract renewals but also serve as
supervisors and evaluators of the assistants’ doctoral theses.37 In addition,
German professors have substantial degrees of freedom when deciding how
to employ their scientific personnel. While assistants have a contractually
fixed obligation to help professors with their lectures and exercises, they also
routinely support professors’ research efforts and perform various other ac-
tivities.38 Thus, in the German chair-based organization, professors have far-
reaching and legitimized access to additional labor power, and this “institu-
tional lever” has direct effects on the utility function of the individual
professor.
Professors, who personally benefit from the output of highly productive
assistants, are motivated to select the most talented candidates, monitor their
activities, and otherwise invest in the human capital of their subordinates.
This is the case, regardless if professors are primarily interested in enhancing
their own reputations within the research community or within the business
34 “[In Germany]. . . the university does not lend its prestige to the professor, rather the mobile
professor brings his or her prestige to the receiving institution” (Enders and Teichler, “The Academic
Profession in Germany,” 443).
35 Guy Neave and Gary Rhoades further characterize the “chair-based model” of academic staff
structure and differentiate it from the “department-college model” in the United States (“The Academic
Estate in Western Europe,” in The Academic Profession: National, Disciplinary, and Institutional Settings, ed.
Burton R. Clark [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987], 211–70).
36 See Ju¨rgen Enders and Ulrich Teichler, “A Victim of Their Own Success? Employment and
Working Conditions of Academic Staff in Comparative Conditions,” Higher Education Policy 34 (Fall 1997):
347–72.
37 Schimank, “Unsolved Problems and Inadequate Solutions,” 121ff.
38 Beate Baldauf (“Doctoral Education and Research Training in Germany,” European Journal of
Education 33 [April 1998]: 161–83) describes the duties and assignments of PhD candidates in the
German system. Although graduate students, doctoral students, and even junior faculty members rou-
tinely support professors or department chairs in the United States, their degree of personal dependency
on individual professors clearly is less strong.
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world.39 By selecting and educating their most talented students as assistants,
professors perform a task that, in Germany’s rather undifferentiated higher
education system, is not otherwise emphasized: out of pure self-interest, pro-
fessors identify, train, and support a segment of highly talented students, who
have few other opportunities to signal their outstanding potentials. Conse-
quently, German businesses and government employers are more likely to
recruit graduates holding a doctoral degree—at least in certain fields, such
as economics and business studies—based more on their having served as
assistants to professors than on other indicators of capability.40
The Envisaged Reforms in Germany: Better or Worse?
In Germany, higher education legislation is a joint responsibility of the
federal government and the sixteen la¨nder. Framework legislation concerning
the general principles and procedures of higher education, since 1976, is
centrally defined by the federal government in the Higher Education Act
(Hochschulrahmengesetz [HRG]). Within this framework the la¨nder develop spe-
cific legislation. Since the initial HRG in 1976, a number of modifications
have taken place.41 The 2002 reform implies two major changes: (a) estab-
lishing formal programs in doctoral education and (b) introducing a new
remuneration scheme for professors working in institutions of higher edu-
cation. Individual la¨nder had until the end of 2004 to translate this federal
legislation into state law. As it has been in effect since as recently as 2004,
the magnitude of change is not yet clear. However, there are doubts about
the extent to which the intended results of the reform will be met.
39 Research-oriented professors have a strong self-interest to invest in the research skills of their
assistants, while more practice-oriented professors have incentives to develop their assistants’ manage-
ment skills, which are valuable for positions outside academia.
40 In this context it is not surprising that the majority of the doctoral staff in Germany do not plan
an academic career. In the field of economics, e.g., 82 percent of doctoral students plan a private
business career. See Ju¨rgen Enders and Ulrich Teichler, “Doctoral Staff in German Higher Education:
Selected Findings from the German Survey on the Academic Profession,” Higher Education Policy 7 (April
1994): 31–36, 34–35.
41 The federal government of Germany first increased its role in science and research in 1969,
when a federal ministry dealing with education, science, and research was established for the first time.
Since the mid-1970s the federal government has taken several steps toward coordinating and standard-
izing higher education throughout the country. The result of these efforts was the first federal framework
law for higher education (HRG) established in 1976, which set loose parameters on the essentials of
higher education provision across all la¨nder. The first draft of the law contained stipulations governing
the development of the higher education system in Germany as well as major organizational principles
such as staff structures and admission procedures. By now the law has been revised six times with the
objective of preparing institutions of higher education for the new demands emerging from globali-
zation, internationalization, and competition. In order to strengthen the autonomy of institutions and
give them more room for their profiling, centralized bureaucratic regulation has been moderately
reduced. Major changes occurred in 1985 (decentralization of curricular design to the individual in-
stitution; until today, however, this modification has not been transformed into la¨nder law), 1998 (in-
troduction of bachelor and master’s degrees alongside the existing Diplom and Staatsexamen programs),
and 2002 (the described modifications concerning the academic staff [Dienstrecht] and the organization
of doctoral education). See David Phillips, ed., Education in Germany: Tradition and Reform in Historical
Context (London: Routledge, 1995).
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Formalization of Doctoral Education
The traditional chair-based system of German doctoral education has well-
known shortcomings. The personalized relationship between professors and
their assistants entails limitations for young academics who want to adopt
independent and individual research foci. In order to preserve the goodwill
of their professors, assistants should serve the professors’ interests by provid-
ing research support and assisting in external projects. However, in order to
gain visibility and recognition in the scientific community, which is important
for future academic appointments, they need to undertake original research,
which may differ from or even contradict that of their professor. Moreover,
given that assistants perform a large variety of tasks besides research, not all
doctoral students will have extensive opportunities to develop their research
skills.
According to the 2002 HRG, doctoral education should be organized as
a highly structured third part of university studies following a predefined
sequence of course work, research training, and writing of the doctoral thesis.
Coaching and teaching responsibilities in doctoral education should be
shared among the professors within a department. Moreover, doctoral studies
should be financed through grants given to the students and not through
their appointment as assistants to professors.42
It is undisputed that the envisaged formal doctoral programs will reduce
the power and discretion of individual professors and promote general stan-
dards in doctoral education. But whether they are appropriate for German
education is open to question. As mentioned above, the traditional modus
operandi of doctoral education performed an important task in the rather
egalitarian German system of higher education: it provided the most gifted
and motivated university graduates with an additional channel to signal their
superior talent in general, and not only or primarily superior research ca-
pabilities, to employers outside the academy. For instance, there is evidence
of an unparalleled percentage of German top managers holding a doctoral
degree.43 And based on a study of the top managers of the 100 largest com-
panies in each country, we found that 58.5 percent of vorstandsvorsitzende in
42 The obligations of the latter in teaching support will be taken over by specialized teaching
assistants, who will be recruited on a part-time basis from graduate students. These modifications closely
follow a proposal that has been developed in the so-called Berlin Communique´, an attempt to harmonize
doctoral education in the European Union. The practice of doctoral education at U.S. research uni-
versities thereby has served as a model. Some countries, like the United Kingdom, have already estab-
lished formalized doctoral programs, while others, among them Germany, France, Sweden, Denmark,
and Finland, are about to introduce them. See Sybille Reichert and Christian Tauch, Bologna Four Years
After: Steps toward Sustainable Reform of Higher Education in Europe (Brussels: European University Associ-
ation, 2003). Nevertheless, in the United States there are contemporary critiques of existing doctoral-
level education programs. See Maresi Nerad, “The PhD in the US: Criticisms, Facts and Remedies,” in
Science, Training and Career—Changing Modes of Knowledge Production and Labor Markets, ed. Ju¨rgen Enders
and Egbert de Weert (Enschede: CHEPS, 2002), 81–108. The main criticisms, though, focus on the
content and objectives and not on the organization of doctoral education.
43 See Michael Hartmann, “Class-Specific Habitus and the Social Reproduction of the Business
Elite in Germany and France,” Sociological Review 48 (Summer 1986): 241–61.
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Germany have doctorates, while only 5.5 percent of chief executive officers
in the United States and 4.1 percent of pre´sidents directeurs ge´ne´raux in France
do.44
In this context, the introduction of formal doctoral programs simply limits
the access of professors to the labor power of the new generation of doctoral
students, thus dramatically reducing these students’ contribution to the in-
dividual reputations of their professors. Why then should professors continue
to invest in the selection, monitoring, and development of these students?
And why should employers continue to assume that graduates with a doctoral
degree are better candidates because of professors’ incentive to select and
develop the most talented students as their assistants?
According to the 2002 HRG, the monitoring of doctoral education should
be done by the department or faculty as a whole. To be effective, however,
such joint monitoring requires that faculty members (individually or collec-
tively) benefit in some way from these students’ success. Without this con-
nection, collective monitoring incentives are only weak and difficult to install.
In Germany there is no mechanism at the faculty level so far that may sub-
stitute for the incentives of the individual professor. Moreover, the introduc-
tion of formal doctoral programs in Germany, therefore, threatens the value
of this degree on the labor market and its acceptance among talented grad-
uates. This is a rather dramatic consequence, since the German system does
not have an elite segment to signal outstanding potential. In this context,
the best students—at least the affluent ones—might be encouraged to migrate
into the hierarchically differentiated systems of higher education abroad and
acquire prestigious foreign degrees in order to be able to signal their superior
talent.
A relevant objection to this line of argument stresses the fact that the
scientific community has developed quite universal screening and monitoring
procedures through the system of refereed publications and conferences.45
By using the evaluation procedures of the scientific community, even in a
German department, where professors have only limited incentives to invest
in the department’s reputation, a “good” formal doctoral program may be
implemented without requiring too much professorial effort. Doctoral stu-
dents are selected, coached, and monitored by the scientific community if
they are required to submit and present their papers at conferences and
publish in refereed journals before they may defend their thesis. Moreover,
to the extent that the department rules allow for coauthored papers in doc-
toral education, the logic of individual reputation management is at least
44 For further details, see Egon Franck and Christian Opitz, “Zur Filterleistung von Hochschul-
systemen—Bildungswege von Topmanagern in den USA, Frankreich und Deutschland,” Schmalenbachs
Zeitschrift fu¨r betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung 56 (February 2004): 72–86.
45 Chris Paul and Paul Rubin, “Teaching and Research: The Human Capital Paradigm,” Journal of
Economic Education 16 (Spring 1984): 142–47.
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partially reintroduced. In this case, research-oriented professors may have
incentives to coach doctoral students because they can profit individually
from joint publications.
However, even if this combination of external and specific internal mon-
itoring works well, it is restricted to the evaluation of research. This means
that formal doctoral programs will produce a different kind of candidate. A
doctoral degree earned in a “good” formal doctoral program proves that the
candidate has superior research abilities in a specific area. However, most
doctoral candidates are interested to develop, or at least signal, their general
talent. So doing would enable them to accelerate their careers in business
and public administration versus pursuing careers in research and teaching
in higher education institutions.
Performance-Related Bonuses for Professors
According to the 2002 HRG, German professors will be remunerated
based on a uniform basic salary, augmented by performance-related bonuses,
which means that the traditional age progression will be abrogated. Within
the bonus structure, three areas will be explicitly rewarded, with the second
and third being new elements: (a) permanent bonuses paid to facilitate the
recruitment of a professor from another institution (or to discourage a pro-
fessor from leaving the institution), (b) temporary bonuses tied to specific
functions in university governance (serving as a president, dean, member of
an appointment commission, etc.), and (c) temporary bonuses paid for out-
standing achievements in research and teaching.
The open question now is to what extent the bonus system will be efficient
in the absence of a market. The third category of (temporary) bonuses may
serve as an illustrative example here. Unlike in the traditional age-progression
scheme, in the new scheme professors’ effort (as well as talent) in research
and teaching will be rewarded. The 2002 HRG states that the policies for
granting bonuses should be developed and implemented by the individual
institution of higher education, meaning that rectors and deans will define
criteria and make decisions about the performance-related salary bonuses.
However, unlike their counterparts in U.S. universities, rectors and deans in
German higher education institutions do not have ready access to market
feedback. German universities do not receive their resources in accordance
with their performance in certain segments of the education market. Instead,
they simply get a sum of money from the state through the standard budgetary
process. How should deans and administrators know what activities of their
faculty to reward if future resources of their institutions are not influenced
by these rewards? And, more important, why should deans and administrators
invest effort in “proper” performance evaluations if these activities have no
implications at all for their institutions’ future budgets?
The German reform has produced a paradox by introducing market-
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oriented governance mechanisms despite the absence of a market. The likely
effects of giving performance-oriented rewards without defining valid criteria
for measuring performance are clear: professors will try to receive their “piece
of the pie” by forming coalitions, weaving personal ties with superiors and
colleagues, and engaging in various other activities, which Paul Milgrom and
John Roberts refer to as “influence activities.”46 In a regime where variations
in output quality do not affect the resources of the institution, successful
coalitions are basically free to reward any activity without making a difference.
Therefore, we expect influence activities to be more prevalent in the re-
formed German system than in the United States, although they are a com-
mon feature of any large organization.
Of course, we do not want to rule out that rectors, deans, and professors
will try to conduct “proper” performance evaluations and strive to enhance
the reputation of their institutions because they are intrinsically motivated
to do so. But if the system is built on intrinsic motivation, the reform is
superfluous anyway. German reformers did not seem to trust the intrinsic
motivation of German professors since they introduced performance-related
bonuses instead of keeping the traditional age progression. The reform por-
trays professors as economic actors. However, the new extrinsic rewards sys-
tem, in the absence of valid criteria for performance measurement, may be
more likely to motivate influence activities by professors than to encourage
them to enhance the quality and quantity of their research and teaching.
As the first experiences with the new remuneration system indicate, ad-
ditional rent-seeking activities may stem from the implementation of new
“hard” budgetary constraints at the level of universities and of departments.
Note that, according to the 2002 HRG, the total sum of salaries paid to
professors is to be held constant at the level of the individual la¨nder in order
to ensure that the average salary of professors remains unaffected by the
reform. At the same time, individual bonus structures were to be designed
at the university level and even at the department level in the new regime.
In practice, this means that the fixed salary budget for professors in a given
land will be specified at the level of the university and, ultimately, of the
department. Under the restriction of a departmental salary cap, we expect
that the professors’ behavior in recruiting new colleagues will change sub-
stantially. Prestigious candidates already earning a high salary at another
institution would “use up” the funds available in the department for bonus
payments quickly and would therefore negatively affect the earning oppor-
tunities of those responsible for the recruiting decisions. The recruitment
and promotion of mediocrity seems likely to become the dominant strategy
of individual income generation in this context. In this respect, the old
bureaucratic solution was superior to the newly created one. Since in the old
46 Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, “An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organiza-
tions,” American Journal of Sociology 94 ( July 1988): S154–S179.
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regime salaries were negotiated with the state ministry, present faculty had
no current or future income at stake in recruitment decisions. Of course,
this did not entirely rule out the recruitment and promotion of mediocrity,
but at least such strategies did not pay out in monetary terms at the individual
level as they will now.
Conclusion
The international competitiveness of national higher education systems
is an important political issue in many countries. These politics drive some
governments to reform their systems by borrowing elements from societies
with systems thought to be superior. However, we would argue that a simple
transfer of isolated elements from one higher education system to the other
has its dangers. As a case in point, we believe that the 2002 German reform,
which sought to adopt elements from higher education in the United States,
is unlikely to strengthen the incentives of German professors to engage in
high-quality research and teaching, as it was intended to do. Instead, the
envisaged changes are likely to generate negative side effects. The switch
from the chair system to formal programs in doctoral education changes the
signaling content of the German doctoral degree. Highly talented individuals
will become less motivated to pursue doctoral degrees, and employers will
be less inclined to rely on the doctoral degree as a key hiring criterion.
Moreover, the introduction of performance-oriented rewards for faculty mem-
bers, in the absence of clear links between individual performance and in-
stitutional reputation and resources, is likely to fuel unproductive “influence
activities” and to promote mediocrity instead of augmenting the quality of
higher education.
Given this situation, there are two basic approaches that could be pursued
in Germany. The first approach requires a radical reorganization of German
public higher education, transforming it from a bureaucratic system to a
competitive market system. In this scenario the state consequently withdraws
from its regulating function, and institutions become autonomous in most
aspects of their decisions. Since the well-being of particular institutions is
closely tied to the educational quality they produce, universities have strong
incentives to reward faculty activities that contribute to their reputation (and
resource flow). This approach ultimately leads to the emergence of a stratified
higher education system that is similar to the U.S. system.
We do not expect that the emerging private sector in German higher
education will become strong enough in the near future to induce legislation
toward more competition and less regulation automatically. Although some
private institutions are highly valued among talented students as well as prom-
inent employers, the pressure on public institutions that stems from this
success is small. The amount of financial resources spent by the government
on public higher education as well as the allocation of funds between insti-
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tutions are not dependent on the performance of these private competitors.
Moreover, compared with the situation in many other countries, private in-
stitutions in Germany face a number of systemic disadvantages. Because they
are largely excluded from state subsidies and severely handicapped in ac-
cessing public research funds, private institutions have a serious financing
problem. Private money is scarce because the tradition of providing higher
education publicly without charging tuition is deeply rooted in the German
society. Professors at public institutions are civil servants who benefit from
attractive pensions, lower social security taxes, and allowances adding as much
as 30 percent of their visible salary. To compete, private institutions have to
pay their academic staff higher salaries. Thus, the prospects for private uni-
versities in Germany may well remain limited even in a longer perspective.47
If German authorities decide to preserve the bureaucratic nature of the
higher education system with its high level of regulation, incentives to pro-
duce outstanding quality in research and teaching inevitably have to originate
from state regulation as well. Under this second approach, the state has to
develop and implement a budgetary formula according to which resources
are allocated among institutions at least in part based on criteria—for ex-
ample, articles published in refereed journals or salary levels of alumni—that
are indicators of the quality performance of both individual faculty members
as well as departments, faculties, and institutions.48 Of course, this procedure
leaves less room for discretion and “influence activities,” because deans and
administrators who reward other activities of their academic staff than those
covered by the budgetary formula risk budgetary cuts in the future.
From an economic point of view, however, the bureaucratic generation
of performance criteria may have an important shortcoming. Whereas the
market forces that lead to the generation of performance criteria in the
United States reflect demand, the political process that generates these cri-
teria in a bureaucratic setting is decoupled from demand. In other words,
even if universities strive to meet the performance criteria laid down in the
budgetary formula, they may not do what ultimately best serves their various
“customers” (consumers of the research, teaching, and technical assistance).
47 See Daniel Fallon and Mitchell Ash, “Higher Education in an Era of Globalization,” in Responses
to Globalization in Germany and the United States, ed. Carl Lankowski (Washington, DC: American Institute
for Contemporary German Studies, 1999), 67–78, 75.
48 There are some examples in this direction. In Australia, funding decisions are made on the
basis of grants attracted, refereed publications, and graduate output. See Linda Butler, “Explaining
Australia’s Increased Share of ISI Publications—the Effects of a Funding Formula Based on Publication
Counts,” Research Policy 32 (Spring 2003): 143–55. In the United Kingdom, nationwide commissions
evaluate the quality of institutions’ research and teaching. See David Greenaway and Michelle Haynes,
Funding Universities to Meet National and International Challenges (University of Nottingham: School of
Economics Policy Report, 2002); Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), Funding
Higher Education in England: How the HEFCE Allocates Its Funds (2002), http://www.hefce.ac.uk/Pubs/
default.asp; Brian Salter and Ted Tapper (“The External Pressures on the Internal Governance of
Universities,” Higher Education Quarterly 56 [Fall 2002]: 245–56) analyze the implications of this (con-
troversial) funding formula for the internal governance of universities in the United Kingdom.
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There remains a difference between serving one’s customers and serving a
formula created by politicians. Efficiency losses are the price to be paid for
state regulation, as in many other cases. This price, however, may be consid-
ered as fair if regulation allows for the provision of desired and otherwise
undersupplied public goods.
